Western Washington University

Western CEDAR
WWU Honors Program Senior Projects

WWU Graduate and Undergraduate Scholarship

Spring 2020

A Republic in its Own Time: The Re-Imagining of Republican
Theory in the Federalist Papers
Jonah Rink
Western Washington University

Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/wwu_honors
Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
Rink, Jonah, "A Republic in its Own Time: The Re-Imagining of Republican Theory in the Federalist Papers"
(2020). WWU Honors Program Senior Projects. 411.
https://cedar.wwu.edu/wwu_honors/411

This Project is brought to you for free and open access by the WWU Graduate and Undergraduate Scholarship at
Western CEDAR. It has been accepted for inclusion in WWU Honors Program Senior Projects by an authorized
administrator of Western CEDAR. For more information, please contact westerncedar@wwu.edu.

Jonah Rink

A Republic in its Own Time:
The Re-Imagining of Republican Theory in the Federalist Papers

In Federalist no. 48, James Madison remarked upon his own task of constitution building:
“The founders of our republics have so much merit for the wisdom which they have displayed,
that no task can be less pleasing than that of pointing out the errors into which they have fallen.”1
This quote captured how Madison saw himself in the historic moment of creating an American
federal constitution. It first demonstrates Madison’s clear admiration for the republics the states
have created individually. More broadly, this was a recognition of the merit and wisdom which
can be found in republican constitutions. Not only that, but Madison saw himself as a
continuation of this intellectual tradition of republican thinkers, as he was tasked with learning
from their mistakes and fixing them in the republic he and the other framers constructed. It was
within this framework, of admiration for past ideas with the need to update them to their own
circumstances, that the American framers found themselves. Though this task may not have been
pleasing, it was a task that Madison and others nonetheless pursued as they saw the necessity of
their historical moment.
The constitution imagined by the American federalist framers was a republic in its
design. Their ideas about government were directly informed by their study of republics and
republican theory throughout history, and this knowledge was taken and applied to their own
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task of constitution creation. These thinkers were educated in the republican tradition, their
discourse was set in republican terms, the problems of government they feared were bred from
the republican tradition, and the constitution held republican principles as its foundation. The
classical republican tradition cannot be separated from the political ideology of the American
framers. In imagining their new government, the American framers did divert from republican
precedent in their conceptions of virtue and the individual, but only in an attempt to create what
they saw as a more perfect form of republicanism. The Constitution of the United States certainly
falls in line with the republican tradition as it is a result of the framers utilizing republican values
and theory in order to apply them to the United States.
The discussion among historians surrounding the political philosophy of the framers has
centered on the liberalism/republicanism dichotomy. At one end of the spectrum are those, such
as Maurizio Viroli and Paul Rahe, who argue that the framers were products of liberalism and
that they created a new, liberal system.2 At the other end of the spectrum are authors, such as
J.G.A. Pocock and Carl J. Richard, who argue the framers are in line with republican thought and
are descendants of the republican tradition of thought.3 Others still, such as Isaac Kramnick,
Gordon Wood, and Andrew Shankman, argue the framers fall somewhere between these
traditions.4 They argue that what the framers created can be described as a sort of synthesis of
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both traditions or at the very least that the framers drew on each so interchangeably that their
specific blend represents a confusion of terms that creates a complicated blend of each. Finally,
Joseph Postell argues that the liberalism/republicanism dichotomy does not exist in such a sharp
distinction in the minds of the framers as they do for contemporary thinkers.5 Regardless, this
balance between liberalism and republicanism has dominated the discourse surrounding the
American founding in the desire to understand the framers’ political ideology.
The argument of this essay, in reference to the existing debate of the intellectual
traditions informing the framers, will focus on how they were members of the republican
tradition. Though there are aspects of the framers’ thought which can certainly fit under the
broader umbrella of “liberalism”, labeling the framers as liberal thinkers exclusively is a
misrepresentation of their ideology. To begin with, there existed no comprehensive ideology of
liberalism as it is understood today. Liberalism in contemporary discourse is a system based on
natural rights which predate government, and are therefore immune from encroachment, which
are centered on private property and personal liberty. Some of these ideas, such as natural rights,
are present in the writings of the Federalist Papers. However, to assert their inclusion is
indicative of a broader liberal basis of political ideology of the framers would misrepresent their
thoughts. The framers were educated in republican theory and likewise republican thought
formed the basis for their political discourse and understanding. They believed they were
creating a republic and therefore their more liberal developments still can be viewed as
consistent with their pursuit of creating a more durable form of republicanism. There was not
such a strict distinction between uniquely republican and liberal ideas for the framers so it was
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not a matter of balancing the two in their mind, but their focus was on creating a republic which
would be stable and resist the problems of past systems of government. 6 Therefore, it is only fair
to the framers to situate them as members of the intellectual tradition they saw themselves as part
of and which dominated their political discourse: republicanism.
The analysis of this essay will be a close reading of the Federalist Papers. By focusing
this analysis through the Federalist Papers, the conclusions drawn are by consequence narrow.
Written by John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison under the pseudonym “Publius”,
these essays had the purpose of convincing Americans to adopt the new constitution. All three
authors are federalists and fall on the same side of the ratification debate, but these essays are not
a comprehensive political manifesto of federalist thought. Though these essays represent a
consistent ideology amongst the three authors, the ideas presented are of these authors alone.
Therefore, when the terms “framer” or “federalist” are referred to throughout this paper, they
should be understood as referring to these three men, as they were federalists and involved in the
actual framing of the Constitution. This is important because the analysis in this paper is through
the lens of the Federalist Papers, and therefore any broader federalist or framer thought
represented in this paper is through the filter of these three authors.
These essays serve as an explanation of the authors’ understanding of republican thought
and its relevance to the task of American constitution building. The authors spend a tremendous
amount of time throughout their essays justifying their model of republicanism through the use
of existing republican theory. These are also effective sources for analyzing the relationship of
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those on both sides of the ratification debate to republicanism. The authors of the Federalist
Papers respond to antifederalist concerns and made positive assertions about the merits of their
own ideas. Thus, these essays are a valuable lens by which the federalists’ relationship to, and
ideas regarding, classical republican theory can be examined. The authors are building off the
republican tradition and applying, and in some cases augmenting, republican precedent in order
to lay out their vision of how the American republic should be structured.
To understand the intellectual tradition the authors are drawing on to form their
conception of republicanism, a discussion of republicanism’s intellectual history is necessary.
Republican theory begins with the first republics in history, Greece and Rome, and continues as
a basis of political ideology to the establishment of the United States. Authors such as Cicero,
Livy, Polybius, and Plutarch are foundational in describing how these original ancient republics
functioned. The ancient authors’ manuscripts served as true observations of the nature of
republicanism for later intellectuals. Though ancient accounts are viewed with more skepticism
by modern historians, those engaged in republican political discourse, and certainly the authors
of the Federalist Papers, saw these ancient authors as foundational to their own understanding of
republicanism.7 The next influential author in the history of republican thought was Niccolò
Machiavelli. The 15th century Italian author approached political theory with scientific rigor as
he sought to answer his central question of what made the Roman republic work. 8 His
Discourses on Livy, a work which analyzes Livy’s Histories, attempts to answer this question
and outlines Machiavelli’s own ideas regarding republicanism from his study of the ancient
models. Building on republican thought, Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws follows
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Machiavelli’s precedent in trying to understand what it is that makes republicanism function. His
work is concerned with understanding the essential spirit of republicanism in contrast with other
forms of government.9 Montesquieu was clearly influential in the minds of the framers as he is
quoted directly numerous times throughout the Federalist Papers, and his ideas are indirectly
addressed when the framers are working outside of republican precedent. Finally, David Hume’s
contribution to republican theory is worth noting because he was more contemporary to the
American framers than the other thinkers discussed thus far. He wrote in the early to mid-18th
century, and the framers were certainly familiar with his work and his ideas were incorporated in
their work.10 Hume was concerned, as were the framers, with making republicanism work in an
increasingly changing modern world, especially making republicanism compatible with
commercial society. 11 These authors are among the most influential in the republican intellectual
tradition. They were certainly influential in the minds of the framers and their ideas form the
basis of the American framers’ republican knowledge.
From these authors of republican theory, a comprehensive understanding of
republicanism can be described which would represent the basis of the knowledge the American
framers possessed. To Madison, a republic was “a government which derives all its powers
directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding
their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior”.12 This quote
underscores a few important aspects of classical republicanism as it was understood by the

Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Translated and edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold
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framers. The first being that republican power rests in its citizenry and is therefore responsible
for providing for the good of all. The “common good” of republican theory is a common good
which is in the interest of the perseverance of the community as a whole. In other words, it is not
always what may be in each individual’s interest, but it is a common good which seeks to
provide for the health of the community as a political entity. 13 This common good was also a
recognition of the interdependence amongst citizens. Individuals saw that their well-being was
tied to that of their fellow citizens, which caused them to collectively pursue a common good.
The second crucial point Madison touched on with his definition is the idea of “good
behavior”, which for the purposes of understanding republican thought can be used to highlight
the role of “virtue” in republican systems. Virtue was the force that motivated citizens to act in
accordance with the pursuit of common good. It was the love of one’s homeland which instilled
in citizens a preference of the public interest over their own.14 For citizens in ancient republics,
this was expressed in its fullest form through warfare. Displaying glory on the battlefield in
protection of one’s homeland was the ultimate expression of virtue because citizens are risking
their own life for the security and freedom of their homeland. 15 Warfare was also the most
palpable example of interdependence for Republican thinkers. Warfare made it nearly impossible
to deny one’s interdependence with their countrymen, as individual soldiers’ lives relied just as
much on the men fighting to either side of them as their own skill in war. The expression of
interdependence in warfare its most clear example in republics, and along with virtue and pursuit
of a common good formed the sine qua non of republican government. The framers derived their
understanding of republicanism from their classical education, and it is from this foundational
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knowledge of republican government’s essential principles that the framers created their own
republic.
This paper will consist of three sections. The first section will discuss the classical
education of the framers which instilled in them their knowledge of and reverence for classical
Greek and Roman authors. This section will also discuss the fundamental principles of
republicanism, namely enlightened rule and pursuit of the common good, which the framers
adopted directly from the classical tradition. Then, the paper will transition to a discussion of
how the federalists sought to solve the problems of licentiousness and tyranny as they appear in
republican thought. This section, along with the first, will situate the framers within the
intellectual context of classical republican thought. Therefore, in the transition to the third
section, which discusses the changes to republican thought the framers instituted, it will be clear
how they are creating change that is compatible with the established republican tradition. The
changes that will be discussed are the new conceptions of virtue and of the individual in relation
to the republic instituted by the framers. By focusing on these three areas, this paper will make
clear the American framers were the products of classical republican thought and that this
intellectual tradition provided the basis for the creation of the American Constitution.

I. Classical Roots of Republican Principles

The framers of the American Constitution were clearly out to create a republic and their
understanding of government was forged in the republican tradition. Their vast knowledge of the
classical republican tradition solidified their vision of how a government should function and its
goals. This classical understanding of governance is manifested in the federalists’ insistence on

9
creating a government ruled through the virtue of the best of a community in the interest of the
common good.
Education for the intellectuals involved in the formation of the United States consisted
almost exclusively of the classics. Greek and Roman authors dominated the education system
and instilled in students a certain reverence for their works. The classics constituted the largest
share of a grammar school student’s material each day.16 What this did was instill the classics as
the intellectual basis of the framers at a young age which clearly stuck with them beyond their
youth. Hamilton and other framers maintained “commonplace books” after their education.
These were books that would be filled with passages and quotes that they saw as interesting and
that they would want to reference later. Madison’s commonplace book, for example, was filled
with Latin quotations of ancient authors such as Aristotle, Sallust, Cicero, and Tacitus. 17 It was
true as well that the framers saw themselves in classical terms. They found kinship with their
ancient counterparts in their struggle against tyranny and in their role as republic builders. 18
This connection to a classical tradition is also apparent in the writing of the Federalist
Papers. Perhaps the most obvious allusion to antiquity was the authors’ adoption of the
pseudonym “Publius”. Publius, as Plutarch said, was one of the original founders of the Roman
Republic. The name Publius then, was a statement in itself, aligning the authors of the Federalist
Papers with ancient republican framers. The Federalist Papers are riddled with allusions to
antiquity when discussing the authors’ own ideas. Federalist no. 63 highlighted the errors of
Socrates’ trial that are used as justification for later checks on the passions of the many. 19 In

Carl J. Richard, The Founders and the Classics Greece, Rome, and the American Enlightenment, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1995) 14.
17 Richards, Founders and the Classics, 24-25.
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Federalist no. 18, Hamilton described the Grecian republics as the most considerable of ancient
confederacies.20 Later republican thinkers are utilized as well in conjunction with the Federalist’s
own use of classical examples. In Federalist no. 9 Hamilton lets Montesquieu’s own words
justify his thoughts on the strength of confederate republics. 21 What these examples make
abundantly clear is Publius’ own conception as a part of this republican tradition and that their
task was to create a republic. Hamilton captures this desire to institute a republic as central to the
task of the framers, as he said in Federalist no. 1. A central object is the assurance of “conformity
of the proposed constitution to the true principles of republican government”. 22 In this way, the
classics served not only as a trove of knowledge for the federalists to learn from, but they
understood these texts as truth and therefore directly took ideas from the classics which they
applied to their own task of constitution building.
The first of these ideas which is referenced throughout the Federalist Papers is that
republics should be governed by the best of a community. This idea has clear roots throughout
the republican intellectual tradition. Niccolò Machiavelli held an aristocratic view of how liberty
is to be maintained in republican government. He saw the best of the community, the nobles, as
being able to best preserve liberty because of their detachment from passions of ambition, and
therefore their focus is on maintaining the republic. 23 Likewise, David Hume professed
skepticism of “the lower sort of people” and their ability to discern what is good for the
community in higher offices of republics. 24 Thinkers in America echoed this republican desire to
have the best among the community in positions of leadership. The Americans rejected any ideas
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of an entrenched aristocracy in favor of the idea of a “natural aristocracy”.25 This consisted of
people in the community who were of exceptional ability and would therefore be able to govern
and discern the good of the community most astutely.
The federalists make abundantly clear that virtuous rule by the best of the community
was an objective of theirs for their new constitution. Federalist no. 63 outlines clearly the need
for the Senate to serve as the “enlightened” guardians of the public good in the face of the unruly
passions of the people.26 This was a real point of emphasis for the federalists as enlightened rule
was both a principle of republicanism, but was also something they perceived as being lacking in
their own time. What both proponents of the Constitution and those against ratification saw was
the inability of the people to identify the few that constituted the “natural aristocracy”, and
therefore the people were not being led by those best able to discern the common good and rule
with virtue, but were elevating demagogues in their place. 27 This insistence on hierarchy to
produce positive results was also a manifestation of the Publius’s view of human nature. The
conventional view being that human nature was governed by reason, interest, and passion –
virtue being the highest form of reason – therefore just as an individual must be governed by an
internal hierarchy, so too must a community elevate those who could act in accordance with
virtue in order for the community to be governed well.28 These ideas of human nature and of
natural aristocracy informed their view of government and its overwhelming need to be ruled by
the best of the community. Therefore, the federalists set out to create a government which could

J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition,
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effectively filter through the passions of the many in favor of the maintenance of an over-arching
common good.29
The structure of the government that the framers created reflected their devotion to the
idea of enlightened rule by the natural aristocracy of the community. The framers of the
Constitution strengthened the offices most immune to the passions of the many, such as the
senate, the president, and judiciary branch precisely because of their desire to ensure enlightened
rule.30 The Senate acts as this check on passions within the legislative branch. Publius said that
by selecting senators indirectly through state assemblies, the Senate “will in general be
composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume that their
attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most
distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the people perceive just grounds for
confidence”.31 Likewise, the electoral college serves the same function in selecting the president;
by creating an impartial body, removed from influence of the people and self-interest, the
framers were hoping to reinforce the idea of selection based on virtue rather than unruly
passions.32 The indirect aspects of the institutions the framers created were meant to ensure rule
by the best of the community, in line with what they saw as a foundational principle of
republican thought.
Rule by an enlightened few in the framer’s government was by no means intended to
create a self-concerned, tyrannical, oligarchy. On the contrary, elevating the most virtuous of the
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community was intended to provide for an even more fundamental principle of republican
government: the need for the government to discern and execute policies which are in the interest
of a common good. The end of government was the procurement of a common good, and this
idea was another that the federalists observed as true in the classical tradition, and therefore was
an idea they sought to apply themselves. Niccolò Machiavelli establishes that a prudent follower
of a republic is one who desires to serve not his own interests, but those of the common good. 33
With common good as the goal of a republic, it is also stated by those in the republican tradition,
that a government must have checks that push people towards the pursuit of a common good and
away from the private interests referenced by Machiavelli. David Hume picks up on this thread
when he said that institutions of government must battle against the “depravity” of man, lest they
bring the government to ruin.34 Indeed, virtues such as frugality and equality must be practiced
by the community as a whole and reinforced by institutions, said Montesquieu, in order for a
healthy republic to persist. 35 The desire to serve the common good and civic virtue are not things
necessarily inherent in individuals, so it is the role of good government to foster engagement in
public life and provide for a common good. 36 Republicanism, therefore, relies on government to
turn the community towards the pursuit of common good as central to creating a healthy
republic.
The need to create and maintain a common good is not lost on the authors of the
Federalist Papers and they make clear their insistence of government’s role in fostering a
common good. Publius makes clear from the beginning in Federalist no. 2, that above all
government ought to see the common good as its goal and that the states are at their best when
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united under one union and the wisest among them are focused on maintaining this unity. 37
Federalist no. 6 picked up on this idea and stated “Commercial republics, like ours, will never be
disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by
mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord”. 38 Significantly, what
Publius demonstrated in this line, is the thought that the citizens of an American commercial
republic must recognize their own interdependence in order to procure a common good.
Individual contention, as Publius said, only leads to ruin, whereas concord and mutual interest
can lead to overall communal well-being. All this to say that Publius’s desire for unity and
communal good is crucial because it is how they conceive of a healthy republic functioning
based on their understanding of previous republican doctrine and therefore they saw the need to
instill these principles in their new government.
The institutions of the framers’ government reflected their desire to create a sovereign
power which was solely concerned with providing for a common good. The framers recognized
the need for institutions to foster and protect the pursuit of a common good in the inability of the
Articles of Confederation to adequately achieve this. The federal government was not strong
enough to force individual states to comply to its policies, therefore states could act against the
mandates of the whole with no fear of repercussions.39 This was a problem which, as is stated in
Federalist no. 22, struck at the very heart of republican theory which relied on rule by the
majority in perceiving the common good. 40 Likewise, the framers saw the need for the federal
government to possess the authority to direct the resources of the republic towards the pursuit of

Jay, Federalist 2.
Hamilton, Federalist 6.
39 Andrew Shankman, Original Intents Hamilton, Madison, and the American Founding, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2018), 14-15.
40 Hamilton, Federalist 22.
37
38

15
a common good. Concerning taxation, Federalist no. 30 states the necessity that “the resources of
the community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit of the Union”.41 It
was in this context which the federalists saw the role of government in regulation. Its goal, in
essence, was to ensure individual pursuit was still in line with what would benefit the community
as a whole.42
Finally, in the federalists’ strongest check against the self-interest destroying the common
good, they took great care to emphasize sovereignty resting ultimately in the hands of the people.
The ultimate need to be re-elected to keep power and the direct reliance of popular support in
being selected to the House of Representatives was intended by the framers to ensure that
representatives never forget what they are ultimately tasked with; the promotion of the common
good.43 This, as well as the authority given to the new constitution, were all attempts to provide
for the common good as the framers saw its crucial place in republican government.
The federalists’ conception of government is representative of their understanding of the
classics and is greatly informed by the republican intellectual tradition. With their understanding
of the objectives of a republican government in place, the federalists also looked to tradition to
perceive the potential pitfalls of a republican system.

II. The Imperfection of Republican Government
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In Federalist no. 9 Hamilton paints previous republics in history as having some fatal
flaws which must be overcome in order to produce a stable government. Hamilton described
republics of the past vacillating between extremes of anarchy and tyranny with few periods of
stability interrupting the states of chaos. Licentiousness and tyranny existed on opposite ends of
a spectrum. Licentiousness was a state of extreme liberty where individuals have no interests but
their own and indulge their own self-interest to the extreme. Tyranny, conversely, was the loss of
liberty at the hands of an individual or faction in power which exerts their own will arbitrarily
over the citizenry. Luckily, in Hamilton’s eyes, the problems of classical republics were not so
immutable as to be impossible to overcome, as he said “They are means, and powerful means, by
which the excellences of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened
or avoided”.44 Licentiousness and tyranny have been problems which thinkers throughout the
republican tradition have had to wrestle with, and problems which the republics of history have
failed to find concrete solutions for. With this as their basis, the federalists wanted to create a
republic that could effectively resist both. Their institutional changes were therefore not
antithetical to the republican tradition, but were meant to fix what had always been seen as the
fatal flaws of republicanism. The debate was classical in scope and their solutions were meant to
create a better republic.
Licentiousness was a problem that the framers first found themselves tasked with
ameliorating if they wanted to create what they saw as a more perfect republic. Licentiousness is
an obvious problem for republics, as they rely on the procurement and maintenance of a common
good amongst its citizens. Publius saw this inability of authority to resist anarchy and
licentiousness as a problem well-documented in its potential to cause the ruin of great republics.

44
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Publius also observed licentiousness as being a flaw in the ancient Greek republics which
contributed to their eventual fall to the Macedonians and later the Romans. Because the Greek
states became so distracted by in-fighting, their confederacy fell apart, as each state was
concerned in their own pursuits rather than in maintaining the confederacy. 45 When this
phenomenon manifests in individuals under a system of government not strong enough to corral
their ambitions it can be equally damaging to republics. Montesquieu called this a state of
“extreme equality”. In this state, each individual sees themselves as completely equal and there
exists no regard for authority. The result is that individuals see themselves as their own sovereign
authority, and therefore all semblance of common good is lost, as each individual sees their own
conception of right as what is best. 46 This represented a great problem in need of a solution for
republican thinkers because to lose the pursuit of common good is to lose the very nature of
republican government.
The federalists’ fears of licentiousness, stemming from its place in classical tradition, was
compounded by their observations of American life around them. What they saw was a nation
which had waxed overly-revolutionary. The federalists saw the people to be too self-interested
and beholden to their own passions for government to effectively promote a common good.
What many of the federalists observed was an “excess of democracy” in the state legislatures as
they felt they were overly-beholden to public opinion.47 In terms of republican theory, the state
legislatures were not focusing on a common good but instead catering to the passions and
interests of individuals. This would have also represented a breakdown in interdependence
amongst citizens, another key aspect of a republican system. If everyone was pursuing their own
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interests, then there was no recognition of communal good or communal dependence. It was also
thought by some of the federalists that government had become hijacked by demagogues who
were driven by their own ambition and had therefore turned their back on ruling through virtue
and in the public interest. 48 In essence, government was failing to adequately quell the ambition
of individuals after the revolution and the federalists saw this as a threat to order and stability for
the new union.
The Articles of Confederation’s inability to check ambition and steer the union away
from the perils of extreme liberty was one of the main reasons licentiousness was taking hold in
the United States. Licentiousness was one of the greatest factors which united Hamilton and
Madison under the federalist cause. They were mutually concerned with creating a “durable
liberty” which required a stronger federal government that could effectively unite individuals in
the pursuit of common good.49 The Articles of Confederation possessed no such authority, and
therefore the union was precipitously reliant on the voluntary cooperation of its members.
Federalist no. 22 speaks of the ability of individual states to ruin federal treaties simply by
choosing not to enforce them, therefore the “faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union,
are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every
member of which it is composed”.50 This created a fear in the minds of the framers that stability
in the republic was continuously at risk to the passions of individuals under the Articles and that
left unchecked, licentiousness had the power to dissolve the newly formed union.
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Keeping these fears in mind, the federalists went about creating a national government
which could effectively check what they perceived to be the unruly passions of the masses and
instead provide for the common good. What the framers created was an essentially aristocratic
government in order to check the democratic tendencies they saw all around them.51 In creating a
government that was less responsive to the passions of individuals, the framers hoped to avoid
the problems of demagoguery they were seeing in the states and elsewhere. 52
The specific institution that best reflects this desire of the framers to separate passions
from governance is the Senate. As there are only two senators per state, they are responsible for
considerably more constituents than those in the House of Representatives, and are therefore
more detached from local interests. This was done in the hopes that they will not be as likely to
“yield to the impulse and sudden violent passions” of individuals and communities. 53 Another
broader fix to this problem of licentiousness was to make laws handed down by the federal
government directly applicable to individuals. In making law apply directly, as Publius in
Federalist no. 16 stated, the federal government’s authority is not dependent on the whims of
individual states, but is binding, thereby eliminating the ability of states to reject common
measures in favor of their own interests. 54 These fixes were manifestations of the federalists’ fear
that unchecked interest was fatal to republics as well as a recognition that only a government
imbued with adequate authority could avoid the dangers of licentiousness.
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The fears over licentiousness drove the framers to create a government vested with
enough authority to resist the passions of the masses. However, this process of establishing a
strong government was a double-edged sword. A government too weak could not effectively
prevent licentiousness, but a government that is too strong ran the risk of tyranny.
The fear of tyranny was consistent amongst republican thinkers of the past and it was
certainly something the federalists wanted to prevent in their republic. Tyranny was understood
by republican thinkers and the federalists to be arbitrary interference at the will of another or of a
faction. Conversely, liberty would be the assurance that citizens of a republic are not subject to
arbitrary interference or domination at the hands of an individual or faction. 55 Tyranny has the
power to undermine republican values and is just as dangerous as licentiousness in its ability to
cripple republics because tyranny also represents a departure from pursuit of the common good.
It is for this reason that classical historians spent so much time discussing military and political
subjects. It is because they were chiefly concerned with figuring out what causes tyranny, and
how they could learn from the past to prevent it in their own time. 56 The federalists recognized
this, and Publius said in Federalist no. 22 that “history furnishes us with so many mortifying
examples of the prevelancy” of republics being undone by leaders who turn away from the
interest of the public in order to wield power to benefit themselves. 57
The federalist framers, being students of the republican tradition, adopted these fears of
tyranny. They saw the Articles of Confederation as being equally inept at preventing
licentiousness as they did potential tyranny. The relative weakness of the federal Constitution
allowed for licentiousness through its inability to force states to comply to its mandates, but it
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also opened the door for tyranny in the ability for states to exercise powers that they did not
possess. Publius noted in Federalist no. 22 that tyranny had sprung more often from assumptions
of power under a weak constitution, than from the authority of strong constitutions exercised
fully.58 Likewise, power was too concentrated under the Articles. Legislative, judicial, and
executive powers were all vested in the legislature, prompting Publius to observe through the
words of Thomas Jefferson that “concentrating these in the same hands, is precisely the
definition of despotic government”.59 It was the relative weakness to prevent power grabs
coupled with the lack of checks on concentrated authority which caused the federalists to fear the
Articles lacked the capacity to effectively prevent tyranny.
The federalists were not the only thinkers who were concerned with the threat of tyranny
to a republic, but the individuals who were opponents of the Constitution also expressed their
desire to eliminate the potential for tyranny in the new government. What was especially
concerning to these opponents was the thought that the Constitution of the federalists had swung
the pendulum too far on the scale of authority, and that the result was something resembling a
permanent aristocracy. 60 Their fears of aristocracy, however, were not wholly incompatible with
the federalists’ views on aristocracy’s role in government. Opponents of the Constitution did not
fear the rule of the natural aristocracy, but were worried about a hereditary oligarchy taking hold.
In creating a distant and powerful Senate, the federalists had provoked oppositional cries to
balance its power with a lower house which was equally strong, and therefore be able to check
the body which those against ratification saw as most susceptible to tyranny through the
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establishment of a permanent aristocracy.61 However, those on both sides of this debate held
conceptions of liberty which largely lined up. They both saw the achievement of liberty through
the limiting of potential for arbitrary power, but also believed that there are areas of life which
government has legitimate authority to control, and that powers which are legitimate should be
strong enough for government to be effective. 62 This, arguably, is exactly what the federalists
sought to do in finding a balance between extremes of licentiousness and tyranny.
With arguments of some antifederalists in mind, as well as the long tradition of tyranny’s
threat to republicanism, the federalists were tasked with explaining how their new government
was to be resistant to tyranny. Consequently, the framers designed each aspect of government
with the fear of tyranny in mind. More broadly, the federalists – especially Madison – recognized
that tyranny could be sourced from factions or individuals but also from the majority of
citizens.63 Therefore, the government sought to both protect the rule of the majority while still
protecting the rights of those in the minority. 64 More specifically, the framers baked in a
resistance to tyranny in the Constitution through the separation of powers and the assurance of
sovereignty resting in the hands of the people. As stated before, the concentration of all powers
within one body was the federalists’ definition of despotism. Therefore, the Constitution
separates these powers into different branches of government so that each can check and balance
one another.65 This disallowed any one part of government from wielding power in an unchecked
way.
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This same line of thinking also caused the framers to vest sovereignty amongst the people
as a whole. If the government owes its existence to the authority of the people and is dependent
on them to remain in power, then they must act in a way that is conducive to the common good
or else lose their power altogether. 66 Publius laid out the difficulty of corrupting a body such as
the Senate because of the complex and counter-balanced system the framers created. For the
Senate to institute tyranny it would have to itself become corrupt, then corrupt the state
legislatures to keep them in power. Then, the people likewise would need to be corrupted lest the
state legislatures lose their power, and finally the House of Representatives would need to be
equal in this tyrannical plot because of their equal share in legislative power. 67 All this to say, the
framers’ fears of tyranny drove them to create a system with so many checks that authority could
not be wielded in capriciousness.
The very recognition of the dangers of licentiousness and tyranny can be observed in
republics throughout history and were equally present in the Federalist Papers. Thus, the
federalists sought to employ solutions that they saw as ways to create a more perfect republic.
Therefore, what manifests as the federalists’ most novel invention in their Constitution still rests
on republican thought. It is only after the federalists’ republican conception of government’s
function was established and their solutions to classically republican problems solved, that the
framers were free to innovate and adapt republican government so that it could adequately be
applied to the American system.

III. An American Virtue
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What the federalists created in the American Constitution can certainly be called a new
brand of republicanism. To remove the classical republican aspects of the framers’ work,
however, is to fundamentally misrepresent their thinking. Their new visions of virtue and the
individual was not an abandonment of common good and republican values, but were both
efforts to create a more durable kind of virtue and a government that was more capable in
accomplishing the goal of creating and maintaining a common good. What the framers of the
American republic attempted to do was capture these positive effects of a system built off virtue
institutionally, thereby removing the reliance in past republics on individuals to bring virtue into
the system of government. What this did was redefine an individual’s relationship with
governance and create a new kind of virtue within the American republic. However, these
developments still must be viewed within a republican context. The framers innovated within
this framework to create a more durable form of republican government which could function in
the United States.
Virtue’s place within republican intellectual history cannot be understated, as it is seen as
the animating factor of republicanism throughout its history. Montesquieu identifies the spirit of
republicanism as “love of one’s homeland” which then leads to a desire to serve it. 68
Republicanism placed reliance on virtue because of its ability to motivate individuals to subvert
their own needs to those of the community.69 It is this desire to serve publicly which drove
republican government because of the way in which it drove citizens to participate in
government and sustain it. Therefore, in a system based on virtue, the individual is only ever
referenced in their capacity to serve the common good. In other words, the worth of an individual
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is measured according to their contribution to the overall health of the community. 70 Aristotle
said that in order to become fully realized as a human individuals must be engaged in politics, as
that is the only activity which provides adequate meaning to one’s life. 71 Therefore, virtue
creates a system that definitively ties individuals to their community. Individuals are not only
supposed to act in virtue but are meant to play an active role in ensuring the government is
focused solely on virtuous rule as well. The thought was that representatives would become
vulnerable to corrupting forces while in power, therefore it is necessary for them to return to
their constituents, by means of reelection. Then, their constituents would remind them why they
are ruling and on what principles – virtue – they must stand.72 In this way, it was the virtue
within each citizen which was the check to corruption in republics. The system relied on an
active and virtuous society made up of engaged citizens for the health of the republic. This is
what the federalists would have known about the prominence of virtue in a republican system
and how virtue had been presented in the existing republican tradition.
With the intense focus on the public good as the goal of republics built on virtue there
existed is a need in the mind of previous republican thinkers for the citizenry to have a shared
perception of what the common good is. Therefore, the thought for much of the intellectual
tradition of republicanism is that republics can only exist in small, homogeneous communities.
This idea operated on the need for individuals to all perceive the common good in the same way,
though there may exist slight differences between citizens on how to obtain a common good,
they were still viewing the same common good just through different eyes. 73 Montesquieu
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echoed this sentiment when describing the size of republics in reference to their overall health.
He stated that republics work well being based in virtue, but can only work in small states,
because of the need for a unified education to instill in its citizenry the same view of virtue. 74 He
continued later in his work and said larger republics cause citizens to develop varying interests
which serve to drive people away from the essential principles of virtue, thereby undoing the
republic.75 The thinkers of the American founding were split on this issue. The federalists
ultimately split from tradition, opting instead for a diverse and large republic, whereas some
antifederalist intellectuals stayed consistent to the republican tradition, thinking a small,
homogeneous republic to be best.
Arguments from some antifederalist points of view echoed these arguments that republics
must be centered on small, homogeneous communities. Their vision of government existed
locally because of this classical emphasis on the necessity of a communal ethos. They first
objected on the grounds that a large, disinterested state, could never account for the diversity of
needs throughout the United states, therefore power needed to rest more locally to truly reflect
the common good of communities. 76 However, even more egregious in the eyes of these
opponents to the Constitution was the fact that the new government did not promote a shared
vision of morality. Just as with republics of the past, they thought government should act as an
example of communal morality. 77 They especially desired religion to fill this void and unite the
country under one school of thought. Most notably, Samuel Adams envisioned America being
organized as “Christian Sparta”; a state with a communal morality and a strict focus on the good
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of the community over that of individual citizens. 78 These arguments were classic in nature and
reflected the insistence in the classical tradition for a shared sense of virtue which could unite
individuals in pursuit of a common good.
The federalists were not convinced of the need for communal homogeneity. Instead, they
insisted that republics could function in the opposite extreme through a multiplicity of interests.
Where previous thinkers had rejected private interests as mere passions that destroyed republics,
Publius reconceptualized interests as rational, and therefore affirmed their place in human
experience.79 Consequently, private interests would need to be accounted for in their new
republic. As Madison described in Federalist no. 10, there are two methods to mitigating the
dangers of interest-based factions, which are eliminating their causes or their effects. To
eliminate factions’ causes would be to destroy the liberty that allows them to flourish. Therefore,
the only reasonable remedy is to try to limit the dangers of its effects. For Publius, the way to
achieve this is to multiply exponentially the amount of interests so that no specific one can
dominate on their own, therefore the only thing left for differently interested groups to agree on
is a common good.80 This idea from Publius represents a clear understanding of private interests
and that these exist alongside virtue, which made traditional models of the small, homogeneous
republics insufficient in accounting for the diversity of interests that would exist in the American
republic.
The acceptance of interests within the American republic was unique, but it is only an
aspect of the truly revolutionary shift in republican thought that the American framers ushered in
with the creation of the Constitution. They acknowledged that individuals did not always act
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with virtue in mind, and therefore they removed virtue as the necessary component to their
republic. Publius said in Federalist no. 51 that if men were angels, no government would be
necessary; yet men are not, and therefore government cannot rely on the hope that men always
act in virtue.81 Though the capacity for virtue existed in Publius’s conception of human nature,
interests and passions were coequal parts. What is worse, is that the hierarchy of human nature
which Publius saw as leading to virtue – rationality, then interests, then passions – was inverted
in the minds of men when they were exposed to the corrupting influence of power. 82
Compounding this problem, the federalists generally perceived a drop in virtue amongst
American citizens in comparison to their ancient counterparts. It was precisely because of the
framers’ recognition of private, especially commercial, interests that they saw the martial aspects
of classical virtue as especially incompatible with the American paradigm. Hamilton said in
Federalist 24 that the continued mustering of militias would cause more harm than good, as it
would cause individuals to be removed from their family and industry for long periods of time,
thereby hurting the public through lost productivity and hurting private industry. 83 This
represented a rejection of martial manifestations of interdependence on the part of the framers. It
is because of this perceived drop in virtue amongst the American citizenry in conjunction with
the framers’ recognition of private interests that Gordon Wood says the framers set out to create
a system that was “no longer founded in virtue”. 84 To remove virtue as a central ingredient in
their republic was remarkable considering virtue’s privileged position in republics throughout
history.
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However, this was not a complete abandonment of virtue on the part of the framers.
There was still room in the American republic for people of virtue, and the system still benefited
from these types of people. Essentially, virtue became federalized in the sense that the leaders
were still meant to rule through virtuous means, but the everyday citizenry lost their active role.
However, the aspect of virtue that the framers valued and wanted to capture was its effects and
its role creating a common good, not the reliance of each member of society to bring virtue to the
system through their civic engagement. The system of checks, balances, and separations of
powers were built into the federal structure by the framers so that interests could flourish without
corrupting the system.85 Where a republic based in virtue would rely on the virtue of its citizens
to check unruly ambitions of those in power, this American system sought to divide government
so that should one piece become corrupted, it would not cause the ruin of the whole, but the other
pieces of government could resist corruption because of their coequal powers. Madison praises
the American “compound republic” in its ability to resist the corrupting aspects of interests by
dividing itself into multiple departments which check one another and are likewise checked
themselves.86 No one branch can govern independently, and therefore the need to find common
ground is engrained into the federal structure resulting in a republic which does not rely on virtue
to overcome interests, but institutionally forces competing groups to govern collaboratively in
pursuit of a common good.
In a system, designed by the federalists, that no longer relies on individuals to provide
virtue, there is room for a new type of individual within the American public. This new mode of
republicanism also created a new definition of virtue and a restructuring of the relationship
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between individuals and virtue in the community. What this system did was essentially make the
individual irrelevant in terms of their own civic agency; rather, a system un-reliant on virtue
viewed citizens in an undifferentiated mass in terms of their public contributions. 87 This loss of
individual civic agency was offset by gains made in the expansion of private life and the
embracing of interests under the American republic. This can only be labeled as a new brand of
republicanism because the very nature of government changed through the framers’ recognition
of individual interest in their system. Where the end of classical republics was the procurance of
communal political freedom, political freedom was the means of the American republic to
achieve an end of private well-being.88 This restructuring of republican thought was truly
revolutionary by the framers as it created a model of republicanism that could still achieve the
essential goals of republicanism (i.e. rule of the majority in the interest of a common good)
without depriving individuals of a private existence to sustain the community.
Thus, the American republic was built to account for the individual and did not wholly
rely on virtue. However, the rhetoric of virtue was not lost in America. Despite the diminishing
role of virtue in the public sphere, virtue took on a different meaning privately. The virtuous
individual was still seen in their ability to contribute to the overall welfare of the community, but
this was no longer a product of civic engagement, but a measure of one’s economic activity. 89
Economic activity is naturally a self-interested activity, but thinkers in the early American
republic recognized its potential to produce virtue. Jefferson echoed previous republican thinkers
in his praise of the yeoman farmer, who’s industry, in their view, contributed to individual
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virtues such as temperance and moderation which made them productive members of their
community.90
What this shift in virtue represents was not a rejection of virtue, but rather an
acknowledgment of self-interest’s place in a society. Essentially, the federalists’ restructuring of
virtue was more a move of pragmatism than a rejection of the classical tradition. In order to
preserve the spirit of republicanism in its quest for common good, the framers had to account for
or even embrace self-interest or else see their republic become crippled by individual interests in
the same way past republics had. A common good was still obtainable even in a system built to
allow private interests to flourish. Hamilton, in Federalist no. 35 outlined how this could work;
he said that individuals in different industries should possess the recognition that their own wellbeing was tied to the well-being of those in other industries. He said, “Will not the merchant
understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interests of the mechanic
and manufacturing arts, to which his commerce is so nearly allied?”. 91 Through this recognition
of mutual dependency amongst citizens, Publius believed that the need to pursue a common good
would never be forgotten in the American republic. Now the manifestation of interdependency
would be in set in economic terms rather than necessitating war to be maintained. Hamilton
clearly believed that interdependence would not be lost in this system, just that it would be seen
in an economic context. Therefore, the framers’ encouragement of commerce and specialization
can be understood in the context of attempting to create a more durable and dynamic form of
virtue, one which could account for self-interest while still fostering a common good.92 This is
the essence of Madison’s Federalist no. 10; that factions may compete in favor of their own
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interests, but by allowing a multiplicity of interests no one can dominate, and therefore what can
be agreed upon is the common good.93 This self interest was still different from that of liberalism
in the sense that it both recognized interdependence among individuals as well as the necessity of
a common good.
The development of private interests and a private sector under the American republic is
inseparable from a classically republican context. It is only in the pursuit of a better, more stable
conception of virtue that a private life is formed in the American republic. The fact that virtue
does not leave the rhetoric of American life even though the framers removed it as central to
their system was a testament to the republican disposition of American intellectuals. Private life
and industry, though more commonly referenced as evidence of America’s founding as
fundamentally liberal, is therefore a misrepresentation of what the framers were trying to
accomplish. It is only through the attempt to create a more durable republic that the framers
arrived at these new conceptions of individual rights and privatized virtue. The American
founding was set in republican terms and is subsequently a byproduct of the framers working to
apply republican ideas in a way that suits American life.

Though historians have argued over the intellectual legacy of the framers, the American
republic is a product of the intellectual history of republicanism. The framers of the American
Republic were educated in republican theory and their ideas and rhetoric are colored by their
republican background. Their goal of fostering a common good and the government’s role in
creating it rings republican. Federalist fear of licentiousness and tyranny are based in past
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republics’ inability to resist them, therefore resulting in their ruin. Even the federalist view of
virtue, though augmented in their model of republicanism, is a response to how they observed
virtue in past republics. Removing republican thought as the framers’ intellectual basis in
creating the Constitution is a mischaracterization of how their ideas came to be. The American
republic was built on the republican intellectual tradition and the framers applied republican
thought to their own contemporary government.
The significance of understanding the American framers and their republican influence is
essential to understanding American political thought. In modifying republicanism as they did,
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, fundamentally changed republican theory. The necessity of
updating classical models of republicanism to suit the American paradigm illustrated the
framers’ recognition that they were not perfect. Therefore, changes had to be made for a republic
to persist in America. However, the fact that the framers nonetheless insisted on their
government being a republic demonstrates the value they saw in the classical models. Though
existing republican theory could not be applied perfectly to the American system, it was clearly
important to the framers that their Constitution be viewed within a republican context.
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A Liberal Conception of The American Republic:
How American Ideology Augments Government Structure

With the basis that the American republic is founded on republican ideals, the
juxtaposition of how a liberal ideology is applied to our American system can be examined. In
popular understanding of American governance, the discussion is always set in liberal
terminology. I was not exposed to republicanism as a school of thought until college, and that
was largely because of my own interest in the subject and being a history major. This means the
majority of Americans have no real conception of what it means to live in a republic other than
institutional aspects. In this, the animating spirit of republicanism is lost, and as was
demonstrated previously, that is a crucial aspect of the system. Instead, liberalism has become
the common creed of America’s social ideology. I am not saying this is a bad thing as certainly
liberalism has numerous positive contributions to our way of life. The protection of life, liberty,
and the pursuit of property are clearly things that improved the lives of individuals in America.
However, the application of liberal ideology to a fundamentally republican system is bound to,
and has, created problems. The relationship between liberalism and republicanism in America
has produced interesting dynamics in American life that are observable today. In a moment such
as ours where large portions of the American populace are realizing the seeming inabilities of
our system to work for everyone it is important to examine why this may be the case. By
examining how liberalism has been applied in America, and where it has come in conflict with
our republican roots, we may be able to see how the tensions and problems which exist today
may stem from.
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The solution to any of the problems observed in America is not to adopt solely a
republican system and reject liberalism, nor is it the opposite. If republicanism and liberalism
existed on two opposite ends of an ideological spectrum, then I see our answer existing
somewhere in the middle. However, what I have observed is that American ideology has lies
primarily at the liberal extreme of the spectrum. Again, this is not in itself a negative, but the fact
is that we live under a system of government which is foundationally republican, and this creates
tension. No tension is greater in American life than the divide between public and private life.
This tension itself is a manifestation of the divide between the republicanism and liberalism
dichotomy, as republicanism is a largely community-oriented system whereas liberalism is
almost solely focused on the individual. The exploration of the relationships between public and
private, the individual and the community, and republicanism and liberalism are the central
relationships explored in this paper. They will help us examine the central question of how we
can effectively apply liberal ideology to our republican system in such a way that we can reap
the best of both ideologies.
Formally, this paper will mirror my preceding work on the republican basis of the
American founding. However, in this paper rather than just exploring how republican ideology
informed the choices of the American framers, I will explore how our contemporary liberal
interpretation of the framers’ work has fundamentally changed how our American system, as it is
manifested today, is different from the one imagined by the framers. Also useful in the analysis
in this paper will be the use of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. This is a text
written about Tocqueville’s tour of the United States in the 1830s. His account of his
observations will be useful in the sense that it allows us to see the beginning of liberal ideology
sweeping the nation. Tocqueville’s tour seemed to take place at a moment when there were still
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republican sentiments clearly alive in the American republic, but where an undercurrent of
liberalism was clearly also beginning to take hold of American ideology. His analysis will be
useful in assessing our own time in reference to the early American republic.
In beginning this dive into the complex relationship between republicanism and
liberalism it may be beneficial to return to some operational definitions of these ideologies.
Republicanism is a political theory concerned with maintaining the political liberty of the
community through the virtue of its citizens as a recognition of their interdependence. Therefore,
republicanism is chiefly concerned with providing for the common good and in is focused not on
the individual, but the community at large. Liberalism, conversely, is a political theory which
states the chief objective of a political community as the protection of life, liberty, and the
property of its individual members. 94 Liberalism’s focus is on the community only in reference
to its ability to allow individual freedom and liberty. These definitions do not speak to the
intricacies of either system, however they will allow us to form a basis of understanding to begin
to explore the relationship between them at length.

Liberal Interpretations of the Foundations of Government

The superimposition of liberalism on the work of the framers both misrepresents what the
framers saw as the basis of government as well as changes what contemporary Americans see as
the fundamental goal of government. For the framers, that was collective security and liberty, for
liberal thinkers, it is individual security and liberty. Understanding this initial divide will help us
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to further understand how both traditions view leadership and their concepts of the common
good.
As we begin further exploring the divide between the thought of the framers and liberal
thinkers, it is important to first acknowledge the threat that liberalism poses to the work of the
framers. Liberalism was not a comprehensive ideology at the time the framers were constructing
the United States constitution. The first liberal ideas were around, and the framers certainly knew
them. John Locke published his famous second treatise in 1689, therefore well before the
formation of the constitution, and the framers almost directly quote in The Declaration of
Independence with their insistence on the importance of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness”. However, the term “liberalism” as it is understood as a political ideology did not
begin to be used until the early 19th century.95 Therefore, when the framers were incorporating
ideas of personal liberty and the idea of the individual, it was not a total adoption of a liberal
philosophy, but a something they saw as adding to their republican system. This is important
because if liberalism did not exist in the way in which it does today, therefore there is no way the
framers could have adequately accounted for its effect on their government. Had they been able
to predict liberalism’s profound impact on American ideology, they may have been more explicit
in their insistence on a republican basis for their government. However, as it stands, it is
important to analyze how the framers viewed the role of government in contrast to what later
liberal thinkers have described as government’s basis.
As discussed previously, the basis of republican government is the political freedom of
the community at large, and the individuals of the community act in virtue to protect this because
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of their recognition of shared dependence. At the risk of belaboring this point, it is important to
understand the sense of shared duty individuals in a republic feel, because it differs from the type
of unity that exists in liberalism. In republics, the only goal of an individual was demonstrating
virtue in service of the community. The government acted with communal interests at the heart
of their decisions as well, doing whatever was necessary to protect the community. In the context
of ancient republics this often meant war. However, this pervasive focus on communally
motivated virtue explains the eagerness often displayed by ancient citizens to go to war, as it was
an opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to the community. I think it is safe to say that
we as a contemporary nation do not want war as a common part of society and that was rightly
left out of the DNA of our republic by the framers. However, I believe the framers still believed
that a devotion to one’s community would be present even without war that would motivate
individuals to act with their community in mind. Instead, this is where liberalism has
complicated the relationship between an individual and their community under our modern
system.
In contrast with republicanism, liberalism is focused on the good of the individual. The
community is a way to ensure individual liberty and security rather than a common focus for
individuals. This reverses the relationship between an individual and their community outlined in
republican thought, and this often creates an adversarial relationship today between individuals
and the broader community. Policies which are intended to procure collective good may be
opposed by individuals because they feel they infringe on their own liberty. This is not a concern
in republican thought because what is for the good of the community is the good of everyone.
Yet, that is not seen the same way today in America, individuals cling to their own liberty and
see any attempt to limit it as an attack from the community. A tangible example is the debate
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over the second amendment. The actual text of the amendment demonstrates the communal focus
of the framers as the right to bear arms in their capacity “as a member of a well-regulated
militia”. Yet, in liberal political discourse it is interpreted as an individual right, that should it be
limited in any way, is a breach of the fundamental freedom of an individual. I am not
commenting on the validity of either argument, I am merely pointing out the fundamentally
different interpretations of the role of community and government under republicanism and
liberalism.
What is concerning in liberal thought in terms of American government is the hostility it
creates between the community and individuals. Republicanism fosters a collective goal which
individuals strive for as part of a broader community of equally motivated citizens set on
providing for a common good. Liberalism fragments the community because of its individual
focus and makes the community valuable only in its capacity to meet the needs of each
individual. This is not a sustainable model as there is no way a community can possibly account
for the needs of every member of a community, and the result is reminiscent of what we see
today, which is mass loss of faith in the community and individuals retreating from the
community to their own individualistic desires. To tie this into the framing of the United States
government, the framers could not have wanted a society structured around disinterested
individuals, as the system they created is a participatory republic.
What causes this divide between republicanism and liberalism is their base conceptions
of what liberty means, as both see liberty as a goal, and in understanding how each conceive of
liberty this divide may be able to be bridged to find a middle ground. The difference is between
positive and negative liberty. Positive liberty is the freedom to do something, whereas negative
liberty is freedom from interference. Ancient republics only had positive freedom and it was
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manifested in their service to their community. In this sense, the ancient citizen was free to live
their life to the fullest within the confines of their system. They lacked negative freedom in the
sense that any imposition that the government made in restricting what an individual could do
was legitimate. In other words, there was no check on the ability of the community to dictate the
lives of its individual members, so long as everyone in the community saw their lives as affected
equally it was fair. The development of negative liberty is a much needed and valuable
development in contemporary understanding of liberty. We, as Americans, have set limits on
which “inalienable” rights cannot be infringed upon. We also have positive liberty as we are free
to pursue a good life within the American system. Therefore, in modern America we should be
able to embrace the positive liberty that republicanism promotes while also adopting the negative
liberty of liberalism which protects us as individuals. However, the problem is we have swung
too far in terms of negative liberty where many Americans view any limitation of liberty as an
attack on their basic rights as an individual. I think in returning to some aspects of positive
liberty we may be able to more effectively promote the common good that the framers saw as so
crucial in their system while still maintaining the important check of negative liberty. These two
ideas do not have to be at odds, but only in the recognition of the emphasis liberalism has put on
negative liberty over positive liberty, can we return to a more balance system.
An equally fundamental question that causes tension between republicanism and liberalism is
the question of who should govern. Republicanism stresses the importance of elevating the best
of the community to rule. This is good in the sense it attempts to place those most able to govern
in positions of power, however it is problematic in its elitist connotations. Liberalism augments
the idea of leadership because of its emphasis on the equality of individuals. If under liberalism,
everyone is their own equally capable individual, then reason stands to follow that everyone is
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capable of leadership. The drawback of this reasoning is that it makes it easier for those the
framers referred to as demagogues to gain power and attacks intellectualism at a fundamental
level. Again, the best leadership lies between these extremes of a strictly liberal or republican
system.
The positives of a detached and intellectually driven ruling class are outlined previously
as laid out by the framers. However, what has not been discussed is the extent to which this is an
extremely elitist view. By saying there are a limited number of people in any community suited
to lead and lead well republicanism assumes very little of the capacity of the “masses”. This also
makes republicanism a less-democratic system. Elite rule exists in republican government in
order to ensure the masses are not being led astray from the common good, but that in itself
assumes that the majority of the community is not able to properly discern what is best for the
whole. It is true that republican citizens have been deceived by a candidate who is able to speak
well, but these examples are surely outliers in the history of republics. A certain degree of
responsiveness by elected officials should be in place, and is something that certainly us as
moderns see as extremely valuable in government.
Another aspect of elite rule overlooked by the framers, but that is certainly a reality of
modernity, is the extent to which those who already have power in other sectors of life are the
ones who gain power politically. This is especially true of money in American politics. Those
who are economically powerful have an outsized voice in politics both in influence and ability to
run for office. According to an article written in 2012, the average contributions for candidates
running for the House of Representatives was $1,689,580.96 This number only increases as you
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move higher in the government. The problem with this is that the House, which by the framers
own design was supposed to be the most democratic element of their government, is still
incredibly out of reach for the average American financially. This means the only ones running
are those who are already powerful, thereby reinforcing their position as a member of the elite.
Liberalism, in contrast, encourages a distinctly more egalitarian view of governance.
Tocqueville speaks of the beauty of equality in America as he says the seeds of aristocracy are
not sown in America as it is in other countries, and this allows citizens to have a greater
influence than ever before in the affairs of government.97 This is certainly a good thing, by
breaking down the hierarchical nature of previous thought of humanity, liberal ideology certainly
allowed more people to become active members of their community politically. This, of course,
was extremely limited in actuality in the time Tocqueville toured America, yet in theory the
liberal ideal of individual agency was something that could break down previously existing
social distinctions and make it easier for non-elite members of society to achieve political power.
While liberalism discourages the elite view of republican governance, it certainly makes
it easier for the framers’ fear of demagogues to be realized in American government. The
insistence in liberal ideology of absolute individual agency breaks down the bonds between
citizens as well as dilutes expertise in government. In the midst of describing the beauty of
equality in America, Tocqueville also speaks of its ability to divide. The static nature of
hierarchical society ties individual together as a recognition of their interdependence whereas
democratic societies encourage individualism and thereby sever the links between citizens.
Tocqueville says that this “dries up the source of public virtues”. 98 In relating this to leadership
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under liberal ideology, it increases the likelihood that leaders will not keep their focus on the
common good, but pursue power for their own benefit. The goal of the framers’ system was to
create a government detached enough from interests to be able to pursue the common good.
However, if liberalism breaks down the sense of duty to pursue a common good, then there is
nothing left for elected officials to pursue but their own gain. In creating a system that only looks
inward for individuals, liberalism creates governance by demagogues.
Besides the danger of self-interested rulers, liberalism also strikes at the very heart of
what is supposed to make participatory government so great: discernment through deliberation.
This is often hailed as the hallmark of a democratic system, that citizens may come together to
work collectively to solve problems in ways that benefit them all. However, the emphasis put on
individual capability and agency of every individual dilutes this aspect of democratic
governance. For Tocqueville, individualism both encourages new thinking, but also creates a sort
of servitude to the whims of the majority. Individuals in a relatively equal system judge
themselves to be their own best judges of what is right. Because they are on equal footing with
their fellow citizens, then they assume a relatively equal ability of everyone else to come to
logical conclusions of their own. Therefore, individuals are left with no objections to the desires
of the majority, as they differ to its conclusions. 99 This system assumes enlightened participation
of individual citizens, yet it crushes the deliberative aspects of democratic governance which are
supposed to bolster its effectiveness. This may seem counterintuitive, but consider how potent
public opinion can be on guiding policy. Even things not based in fact are accepted and acted
upon today simply because it is found in a “reliable” source, or distributed broadly. In leadership,
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it is best to have individuals in place who are intellectual and deliberative in nature, and these are
the individuals the framers wanted as well.
The extremes of liberal and republican thought in terms of what constitutes effective
leadership both hold negative aspects. The elitism of a classically republican conception bars
large portions of the population from participating in governance. Yet, the liberal system of
extreme equality in capacity to govern also cripples the effectiveness of government. Therefore,
this is another example of where modern American government should work to blend the two.
Policies such as civil service exams and protection are a step in this direction. They are inclusive
in that anyone can enter the program as well as secure in the fact they are attempts to ensure
individuals who can govern effectively are the ones given the opportunity to lead.

Liberal Insistence on the Threat of Tyranny

The problems of licentiousness and tyranny, as discussed previously, are clearly
problems which the framers went to great lengths to ameliorate in their republic. As with the
foundations of government, these are aspects of the American system which are complicated
with the addition of liberalism. The problem of licentiousness I see as being particularly
amplified by liberal ideology. The intense focus on the individual apparent in liberal ideology
would seem to make a state of licentiousness even easier to devolve into. The problem of
tyranny, however, seems to allow for some common ground between republicanism and
liberalism. Both ideologies wish to protect against and rid themselves of arbitrary interference,
and through this common desire to guard the community against tyranny there may be room to
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strike a balance on authority in such a way to adhere to both liberal and republican fears of
tyranny. These fears are something addressed consistently by the framers of the American
constitution and the solutions they devised were from a republican perspective, therefore to
understand how liberalism has shaped these issues in American government today it must be
through the lens of how liberalism shapes our own understanding of what the framers created to
solve these problems.
Licentiousness, as defined previously, is a state of extreme self-interest where individuals
possess no regard for anything but their own desires. This represented an obvious threat to
republicanism for the framers as it goes against all that republicanism stands for. In a licentious
state there is no common good, virtue, or recognition of interdependence. The framers’ solution
to this was as ideological as it was institutional. Ideologically the framers fell back on republican
tradition in the hopes of resisting licentiousness. The encouraging of virtue and of recognizing
citizens’ interdependence were crucial in keeping a communal perception for the framers.
Institutionally, the framers created aspects of the government meant to resist the self-interests of
the many. As discussed previously, the senate and president were supposed to be lofty and
untouchable positions so that they could focus on the common good. Underscoring the framers’
response to the dangers of licentiousness was their desire to vest enough authority in the
government they were creating in order to resist individual ambition. This was evident in the
framers’ critiques of the Articles of Confederation, as they felt it did not have the power to force
compliance of the individual states. It was obviously a point of emphasis for the framers to create
a system resistant to the perils of licentiousness and its ability to divide their republic.
Liberalism undermines the efforts of the framers to guard against licentiousness.
Specifically, liberal ideology strikes against the ideological checks against licentiousness that the
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framers adopted from republicanism. Virtue and interdependence are substituted for ambition
and self-interest in a liberal system. Without these ideological checks, the institutional checks
will also suffer. The ability of bodies such as the Senate to unite the nation in pursuit of a
common good are only as capable as its members. It would be difficult to conceive of individuals
rising to power which are only concerned in the common good from a society which encourages
liberal pursuit of self-interest above all. Therefore, all that the institutional checks of the framers
are good for is to block individual ambition in government stagnation rather than heading a
unified effort towards a common good. That is how the Senate seems to operate today, as a place
where measures die, not a body devoted to the common good. This is due to the loss of an
ideological framework resistant to fragmentation in self-interest, rather, liberalism only seems to
move us closer to a state of licentiousness in its inability to unite individuals precisely because of
its emphasis on individual self-interest.
To be fair to liberalism, much of its emphasis on negative liberty and the protection of the
individual stems from its intense for focus on resistance to tyranny. This is an area where some
overlap can be observed between liberalism and republicanism as both are concerned with
guarding against the influence of tyranny. As stated previously, tyranny can be understood as the
arbitrary imposition of the will of another. The crucial difference in both ideologies’ conception
of tyranny is where they see it stemming from. Republicanism is primarily concerned with
tyranny from abroad. Classical republicanism focuses on the political liberty of the community,
and so long the community is free from tyranny as a political unit, then they would conceive of
themselves as free. Liberalism, again as an extension of its emphasis on negative liberty, also
fears tyranny from within the government over individuals. Therefore, under liberalism, the
government can be tyrannical in a way that is not conceived of under republicanism. Recall that
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citizens of ancient republics did not see any interference in their lives as unjust, so long as it
affected every citizen equally. This is not the case in liberalism, as liberalism sets a limit on the
extent to which government can control individuals. This limit is the unalienable rights which are
meant to predate government and therefore be beyond reproach.
These different conceptions of tyranny create disagreement between republicanism and
liberalism in the amount of authority which should be vested in government. Early shades of
liberal resistance to an overly-authoritative government can be observed in the original debates
over the American Constitution. There were those who were against the Constitution on the
grounds that the framers had created a system which ceded all authority to the federal
government, thereby robbing the liberty of individual states’ power. Today, in a society which
has almost entirely adopted this liberal point of view, too much emphasis is placed on negative
liberty in the attempt to guard against tyranny from within. This is another area in which
liberalism has had an outsized voice. Again, by taking aspects of each ideology, a balance can be
found which incorporates liberal developments while also including the republican principles
that our system was founded on. Namely, the republican emphasis on political liberty of the
community and procurance of the common good need to reenter our political lexicon in order to
check liberalism’s tendency to fragment communities into a state of licentiousness. I think this
political isolation can be seen today as the polarization of our system seems a direct result of
liberalism’s rejection of a common good approach to government for one which serves to affirm
the individual only. If we were to adopt more republican ideology, we could refocus government
on the pursuit of a common good, and by keeping liberal emphasis on allowing intervention only
to the boundary of inalienable rights, we can strike a balance between licentiousness and tyranny
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that the framers would have wanted in their system and one which can move us past our modern
fragmentation.
A Liberal Individual

The new conception of an individual and community relationship was an important
aspect of the system that the framers designed, however it is also the most easily corrupted by
liberalism. It is more crucial to understand the ideological basis of this aspect of what the framers
created than any other piece of their system. The framer’s decision to make room for private
interests and redefine virtue in individuals was in an effort to create a more durable form of
republican virtue rather than an adoption of liberal ideology. This is significant because it is
contemporary theorists which have tried to attach liberal ideology to this relationship, not the
framers. By defining this relationship through liberal ideals, the divide between individuals and
their political community has only deepened. What is worse, is individual relationships have
suffered as well as we have embraced a system of competition rather than cooperation. The
framers never intended for individuals to forget their interdependence on one another for our
well-being, yet I think today Americans adhere to a system which rejects this relational basis for
our individual and community relationship.
The redefinition of the individual by the framers was at its core a redefinition of virtue.
What the framers crucially realized is that past republics had been crippled by citizens’ inability
to separate themselves from their self-interest in such a way that their actions would always align
with virtue. Ancient republics relied too heavily on the virtue of the everyday citizens so the
framers established a new relationship between the individual and their commitment to
communal virtue. For the purposes of analyzing this relationship, it is best to think of virtue as
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becoming federalized in the American system. In this sense, virtue was only required and divided
amongst certain levels of the American system. The average person was left free to pursue a
private life because the system no longer required them to bring virtue to it. Yet, the American
system was still open to, and indeed encouraged, virtuous citizens who were focused on a
common good to pursue roles in government. Institutionally they ensured that even if individuals
operated without virtue, a common good could still be procured through government, or at the
very least ambition could not break the system. Virtue, for the individual, took on an economic
context in the American republic. The worth of an individual was no longer measured by their
contribution publicly, but in their ability to be economically productive members of society. This
shift had many causes, from the want against continued warfare, to the Protestant
conceptualization of virtues which took on the context of work ethic, but most importantly it was
an attempt of the framers to create a more durable form of virtue. This new form of virtue was
more durable because it allowed room for self-interest. Where previous republics had relied on
citizens to place aside self-interest, the American framers realized it could not be easily
eliminated, and therefore rather than risk self-interest undermining their republic, they allowed it
to flourish.
The self-interest envisioned by the framers was not one that was unlimited, but one that
had clear confines. For one, the framers never envisioned a commitment to self-interest that
would eradicate our sense of interdependence. As previously noted by Hamilton, the merchant
would recognize in a commercial society that the good of the merchant was reliant on the good
of the farmer. This tied individuals together that though their aims may have been individual,
they were all pursuing economic well-being the same way. The economic pursuit envisioned by
the framers did not pit neighbors against one another but united them in pursuit of a better life.
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Tocqueville speaks of this form of pursuit as integral to the early American identity. Individuals
were not pursuing opulence, but were attempting to carve out a modest or restrained wealth for
the goal of slightly bettering their position. Most importantly, Tocqueville notes that Americans
refused to sacrifice their own moral convictions in order to obtain more, but would only seek to
obtain within their moral boundaries.100 The transitioning of virtue to economic rather than
political terms was never intended by the founders to create a system hostile to cooperation and
interdependence.
The addition of liberal ideology to the economic system envisioned by the framers does
not make the same considerations to the protection of virtue and interdependence that a
republican ideology did. Tocqueville described the early warning signs that a different kind of
economic system than the one envisioned by the framers was beginning to take hold in America.
Because every individual is pursuing the same goal of material well-being, they naturally come
into competition with one another. Therefore they continuously chase material gratification in
order to try to reach a greater degree of well-being, but this constant pursuit of equality is
unattainable says Tocqueville. 101 This drive for a goal that is unfulfillable causes a tension to
exist in American life which Tocqueville notes. Even amongst modest well-being, Americans are
always searching for more material gratification to satisfy themselves.102 It is easy to see how
this system turns inward on itself and divides individuals. Anything that one’s neighbor has is
something thy do not themselves possess. Therefore, they are in competition with one another to
collect and hoard as much wealth as possible because they both possess an ever-consuming
desire for more.
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As liberal ideology has progressed to modernity, we find ourselves in a system
completely hostile to a restrained and cooperative economic style of pursuit. We live in an
economic paradigm which is ripe with examples of individuals forfeiting the good of those
around them for the pursuit of economic gain. Take for example the outsourcing of entire
companies to other places or nations, often to the great detriment of their original communities.
Cities like Detroit or Pittsburg stand as reminders of the damage that can be felt from the loss of
major industries. Yet, the companies that left did so, seemingly, with little regard for their
original homes. Rather, they would sooner leave and allow the demise of their community in
favor of better tax rates and cheaper labor. Even on a micro level, everyday interactions are only
seen in their transactional capacity, and a good deal is one where the individual making it comes
out ahead in some way. How often is the question “what is in it for me?” asked when individuals
are petitioned to join a cause or assist their community members? An oft cited passage from
Adam Smith, considered by many to be the father of capitalism, states that it is not by the
benevolence of the butcher, brewer, or baker we expect our dinner, but because of their own selfinterest and their desire to obtain what they want themselves. 103 What this passage does not say,
is that the butcher should be taken advantage of, so as to extract the most meat possible for the
least payment. Though it is transactional for Smith, it is still not hostile to mutual benefit.
However, that is not how individuals are taught to conceive of economic exchange today. Rather,
everything is in play so long as it contributes to an individual’s economic success. We are
encouraged to “pull yourself up by your bootstraps” and do everything on your own. The result
is a system with no room for compromise, and one which makes our greatest rival anyone else
who is pursuing a better life for themselves.
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Overall, liberal economic ideology’s greatest threat to the American system is the
abandonment of any sense of interdependence. By putting us all at odds with one another, all
communal trust and loyalty is destroyed, and we are left as isolated and fragmented individuals.
This is not conducive to a republican system built on the ideals of cooperation and shared
ambition. Our modern conception of the individual undermines what the framers were trying to
create and leaves us with an incomplete system.

The American Dream

As was stated at the beginning of this paper, the true tension between republicanism and
liberalism is how each conceive of the relationship between public and private life. Each
ideology associates one or the other as constituting what we can call the “good life”. For
republicanism, this is in public life, as serving the community is the greatest thing an individual
can do. Conversely, liberalism associates private, especially economic, life as holding the key to
true happiness. Becoming economically potent and powerful is the measure of an individual. In
order for us to solve the inherent contradiction between the two ideologies pulling at American
society, there must be a conversation regarding what we can agree constitutes the good life.
What is important in life, where we derive meaning, and what gives us purpose are the questions
that must be sorted out for us to ever strike a balance between republican and liberal thought.
The particular aspect of liberalism which has redefined American life is its application to
economic theory. Though liberalism was conceived of as a political philosophy, it has
transformed to take on greater significance economically. While liberal ideology is certainly
invoked in terms of government deregulation and in limiting government power, it is the
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economic sector which has benefitted from this shift. The powers which liberalism strips from
government to not disappear, but simply shift to other areas of American society. Take for
example healthcare, if government is relieved of its responsibility to provide healthcare to its
citizens, healthcare does not disappear. Rather, it has just become privatized in American life.
Likewise, where we place value in American life has shifted to the private sector over the public
as a part of liberalism’s effect on republican government power. The ramifications of this aspect
of liberal ideology is twofold. First, the government has been limited in its ability to perform its
fundamental function of providing for the well-being of all, to the point that the American
republic does not hold unified sovereignty. Second, because liberalism values economic success
as the greatest achievement for an individual, Americans have lost the ability to achieve
fulfillment in their lives. Rather, our system encourages ceaseless acquisition at the expense of
all else. Without a renewal of republican ideology our American republic will continue to be
weakened and any sense of communal interdependence will be completely forgotten.
At the root of how liberal ideology has reduced the ability of our republic to provide for a
communal good is the splitting of American sovereignty. This is a problem which has long been
flagged as dangerous by political theorists. When sovereignty is split between two or more
entities, there exists the potential for conflict. If two bodies, equally capable of imposing their
will have conflicting interests, then there is not authority adequate to resolve this disagreement. It
is this reasoning that the framers opted for a strong federal government in the first place. Without
it, there existed to power to resolve issues between equally powerful states under the Articles of
Confederation. However, the framers created an important check on their federal government
that was meant to ensure it would not become tyrannical. Sovereignty was not vested in the
federal government, but in the people of the United States. This is crucial because it is only
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through the consent of us as citizens that our federal government has power. In other words, the
government is only a vehicle through which we, the people, are able to enact our will as the seat
of sovereignty. In this way, the federal government is fundamentally beholden to the interests of
all its citizens equally, and holds a responsibility to provide for our common good.
However, liberal ideology’s fear of central authority, as it concerns individual rights, has
caused the American republic to be weakened in the sense that we have decided there are areas
of life that the government has no legitimate authority over. The sector that American liberalism
has most shielded from government intervention is the economic sector. Again, just because the
power is taken away from government does not mean that it disappears, but that it is moved. In
this way, the American people have ceded some of its sovereignty to the private sector. Yet,
crucially, unlike the government, the private sector owes nothing to individual citizens for its
sovereignty. The private sector is driven by indifferent forces aimed solely at the expansion of
capital, not the good of its individual actors.
Take for example benefits distributed by companies, such as paid time off or sick leave.
Workplaces provide these benefits to better attract highly qualified workers, yet if a company
decides it will no longer provide benefits there is nothing to say it cannot. Sure, it may lose many
of its workers, but what of those workers who cannot afford to quit and find another job? What
responsibility does the company have to provide for the well-being of these workers? So long as
they are fulfilling their contractual agreement to pay individuals for their labor, they are
providing all our system says is owed of them. What can this be called other than implicit
recognition that the private sector holds significant power over our ability as individuals to
obtain well-being? Agrarian republican thinkers, such as Jefferson, saw wage labor as a form of
“slavery” precisely because the wage worker is beholden to the will of whoever is paying. Yet,
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the American republic has become dependent on the private sector to provide for individual wellbeing, which has in turn divided sovereignty in American life between public and private. No
better tangible example of this exists than the 2008 financial crisis, which fully highlighted the
way in which American livelihood is divided. The facts that banks, who had run themselves into
bankruptcy through predatory and opportunistic lending practices at the expense of the American
people, were termed “too big to fail” clearly shows the inability of our republic to ensure the
well-being of its citizens. Rather, we have become beholden to private entities which are not
equally beholden to us, and this has severely limited our republic’s ability to ensure any
semblance of a common good.
Tocqueville, in imagining what the American system could become, saw the grave
danger of pursuing economic self-interest at the expense of ceding sovereignty. He says that as
individuals become chiefly occupied with their self-interest, they forget the relationship that exits
between their own particular well-being and the prosperity of all. These citizens then become
unconcerned with governance as it is viewed as an inconvenience or a distraction from their true
task of creating their fortunes. He says “there is no need to strip such citizens of their rights: they
let those rights slip away voluntarily”. In attending only to what they see as their own affairs,
they neglect what Tocqueville describes as their chief affair: being their own masters. 104 It is this
process which can has seemingly taken hold in modern America. It may seem like a perfectly
sound decision to limit government’s ability to regulate the economic sector because of it hinders
an individual. But in only taking a self-interested view, an individual loses sight of how
weakening the government only strengthens private actors to act with impunity.
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An example of this phenomenon is prescription drug prices in the United States. They are
absurdly high compared to the rest of the world. Private medical firms are able to raise their
prices because it is good for them and because the republic has been told it does not have power
over them. Individuals who work for drug companies, seeing the opportunity to increase their
own fortunes by deregulating the drug industry, obviously would want this. However, the ability
for drug companies to endlessly raise their prices allows them to gain power over individuals. In
a paradox of self-interest, by tying the hands of government out of individual economic pursuit,
we have become beholden to these private entities. Now, a common situation for individuals is
that they may not be able to afford drug prices that they need to keep themselves alive, so they
turn to the government for help. Yet the government has been rendered powerless because liberal
ideology states that the government has no ground to interfere, or that somehow regulation
would be an overreach. Now, an individual is left looking towards these companies to lower their
prices out of benevolence and regard for a common good, but of course private entities are not
tasked with providing for individual “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”. So, the
individual sits in a hopeless situation where they have now become beholden to private actors
because they literally hold the power over their life. We have now clearly reached the extent of
Tocqueville’s fears as our misguided attempts to pursue self-interest have left us servile to the
whims of an unchecked private sector, stuck under the sort of tyranny liberal ideology has long
been hostile to.
The important concept when discussing authority over the economic sector is regulation.
Republicanism is not socialism. Republics of the past did not own the means of production, but
were integral in ensuring they operated in a healthy way which promoted the goals of the
community. For example, Rome had laws restricting conspicuous displays of wealth as an
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attempt to curb extreme wealth inequality. Likewise, their economic paradigm encouraged
reinvestment from the wealthiest individuals for the betterment of the community. Liberal
economic theory, especially in the United States, has become increasingly hostile to any
economic regulation. It seems there exists only two options in American economic thought:
laissez faire or socialism. Republicanism, if it is allowed to re-enter American thought, offers a
third solution. It allows for government to possess the ability to ensure our economic system can
operate for the good of all rather than for just a few at the top. Republican regulation can be
compatible with a capitalist system as well. People can still be allowed to pursue private ends,
just not at the expense of the collective good. Capitalism meshes with a republican system when
it is imagined the same way it was imagined by the framers; not as a zero-sum system of
competition, but one where individuals recognize that by raising the well-being of all, they see
their own well-being rise as well. However, the ability of the American republic to curb
economic self-interest has been all but eliminated, which leaves us in an economic system
without interdependence, and one which has rendered us at the mercy of its desires without the
power to control it.
Liberal economic theory has clearly produced problems at a system wide level, however
it has also changed us at a fundamentally personal level. Economic pursuit has become how we,
American society, has defined the idea of living well. By living well, I mean what we value as a
society or what we view as the picture of a perfect life. In other words, Americans tend to
measure whether or not a person has a good life based on their economic status. A billionaire is
the peak aspiration of what can be achieved in America, likewise middle class members are
doing well but could have more in life, and those in poverty are judged by some as not having
lived up to the potential of the American dream.
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On the outside, this system of endless pursuit of economic gain seems simple, but upon
deeper examination it has real complexity. If any individual were to be asked why they want
more money, there are usually motivations besides simply having more wealth. Answers may be
along the lines of providing a better life for them and their family, getting their kids in school, or
simply being able to stop working and retire eventually. At the heart of these answers is what we
as a society may truly see as important in life: each other. If we were to truly examine the heart
of economic pursuit it would be that money is a means to the end of being able to enjoy time
with those we love. Be it our families, friends, or other loved ones, time with them and
enjoyment is what people are ultimately striving towards. The problem is that liberalism does not
make room for this part of the equation. If the goal of liberalism is individual liberty and
security, and the means to this is individual acquisition of wealth, what is to say how much is
enough? We have never defined what living well means in our liberal system besides that it
means being economically better off than you were yesterday. This leaves no room for anything
besides striving towards economic gain, because if it is the only vehicle to obtaining our
American understanding of living well, then what other option is there to pursue it
wholeheartedly?
The true tragedy of this unattainable goal of American society is that it causes individuals
to pursue wealth at the expense of the very things we are supposedly striving to ensure.
Tocqueville observed this phenomenon in its beginnings. He says of the pursuit of “material
gratification” amongst Americans that they grasp at everything that comes before them as if they
“suffer from the perpetual fear of passing away before finding the time to enjoy them”.105
Because Americans’ well-being were so intertwined with their ability to acquire wealth, it is no
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surprise that they lived in a constant state of fear of not having enough resources to allow them to
live well. This phenomenon seems just as true today as it did for Tocqueville. We choose the
pursuit of economic gain over the enjoyment of loved ones constantly. How often is the narrative
that if you devote yourself wholly to your job in your twenties that you may reap the benefits at
an older age? Parents are often forced to miss significant moments in their children’s’ lives
because jobs only allow for so much vacation time a year. Because our only method of living
well is economic, we are afforded no choice in the matter. It is either devote yourself to your
work or lose any ability live well, and this tears us from the aspects of life which we truly value.
We may devote ourselves to economic pursuit because it is a means to live well, but the
economic sector demands a level of devotion that leaves us unable to enjoy the aspects of life
which add value.
Relentless economic pursuit is only half of the picture of how liberal economic ideology
breaks down the individual under the guise of self-interest. It’s emphasis on the necessity of
individualism in economic gain isolates us from one another, and most importantly leaves us
without a safety net. Economic gain is an individual practice in American society. The mantra of
“pulling oneself up by their bootstraps” is pervasive in American culture, but is also a signal of
the dividing aspect of American economic thought. Therefore, when an individual is not able to
“pull themselves up”, there exists no capacity for the community to help them achieve living
well. Because individuals are viewed as adversaries to the ultimate goal of wealth acquisition,
how would helping a fellow individual be in one’s self interest? The fact is that it is not in the
American system. This is a direct result of the emphasis on individualism present in liberal
ideology. It creates a system which assumes that any failure to economically advance is a result
of a defect in that individual, thereby creating no incentive to improve the well-being of all. This
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is a fundamental mistake in liberal ideology as it completely destroys the interdependence that is
so crucial to keeping us united as a republic. Republican ideology is unafraid to help all members
of the community because its focus is not on individual well-being as an end, but in collective
well-being which in turn provides individual security in the fact that no one is alone in their
pursuit of a better life. Until American society can recapture this aspect of republican thought,
we will all be left chasing individual well-being, amongst individuals who we view as enemies,
and devoid of any assurances that we will ever be able to live well.
Recontextualizing what we, as members of the American republic, are striving for is
crucial to feeling security in the fact that we might all achieve a level of living well. Republican
emphasis on the idea that we are united in creating a collective well-being brings a sort of
reassurance that liberalism lacks. With this assurance, it leaves room for the aspects of life
identified previously that I believe can be agreed upon as the best things in life. The focus of
republics of the past was never economic, but in public things. Participating politically alongside
your fellow community member for the good of your family and friends is the greatest thing an
individual could do. It is this animating spirit that must be recaptured. Money and economic
pursuit is something that never satisfies and always leaves individuals wanting more.
Conversely, the fulfillment that can be gained through community is one that is infinite and
uniquely beautiful. Without it, the profound frustration and fear felt by so many today is no
surprise, as individuals are stuck in a system that can never be won and which ultimately leaves
individuals isolated. Until we can have a restructuring of our priorities as a society, I fear that we
will only be driven further apart and unable to settle on what it means to live well.
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